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FOREWORD -BACKLASH AGAINST THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE STRATEGIES
Linda Hamilton Krieger * For civil rights lawyers who had toiled through the 1980's in the increasingly barren fields of race and sex discrimination law, the charmed passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act through the U.S. House and Senate and across a Republican President's desk must have seemed vaguely surreal.
7 136 CONG. REC. S10287-01, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1990, at __; 136 Cong. Rec. S9809, S9814; 136 Cong. Rec. S10321. 8 On July 19, 1990 , Vice President Dan Quayle said of the Act, "the Administration is not going to have a quota bill crammed down its throat disguised as a civil rights bill." Steven A. Holmes, Accord is Sought on Rights Measure to Avert a Veto, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1990 , at 1. Quayle's comments followed upon those of White House Chief of Staff, John Sununu, who on July 17 th , stated, "The bill, as crafted right now, is a quota bill..." Steve Gerstel, Senate Limits Debate on Civil Rights Bill; Veto Threatened, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, July 17, 1990 . Senator Hatch referred to the bill as "terrible," even "heinous," and predicted that it would "create a litigation bonanza." Concluded Hatch in one interview, "[e]ven a cursory review reveals that (the bill) is simply and unalterably a quota bill." In his veto statement, delivered on October 20, 1990, President Bush justified his action by stating, "I will not sign a quota bill." George Archibald, Special Report: The Bush Record, WASH. TIMES, Sep.13, 1992, at A8. 9 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991 . 10 The disparate impact case was Wards Cove Packing Company v. Atonio, 490 U. S. 642 (1989 It must have been difficult for traditional civil rights lawyers, reeling from these many setbacks, to comprehend the triumphal enthusiasm with which Republican senators and administration officials celebrated the passage of the ADA. How could such a transformative statute, requiring not only formal equality, as the non-discrimination concept had traditionally been understood, but also structural equality --the accommodation of difference --have passed by such lopsided margins? How could it have garnered so much support from Republicans in the House and Senate, or from a Republican President who had in other contexts so vigorously resisted the expansion of civil rights protections?
How could the President and the Republican Congressional leadership embrace the disparate impact provisions of the ADA so readily, while at the same time sharply decrying them in the doomed Civil Rights Act of 1990?
There was incredulity in the traditional civil rights community, but there was also hope --hope 13 42 U.S.C. §2000e (as amended).
14 Title VII's disparate impact theory does represent a structural model of equality. However, that theory can be applied only in very narrow circumstances. For a discussion of this issue, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 , 1162 , n. 3 (1995 . 5 not only that the ADA would transform the lives of disabled Americans, but also that the theoretical breakthrough represented by reasonable accommodation theory would eventually play a role in solving other equality problems, which the more broadly accepted equal treatment principle had proven inadequate to address.
The Americans with Disabilities Act, and the administrative regulations that followed it, seemed to hold enormous practical and theoretical potential. The Act's definition of disability had been drawn broadly, to cover not only the "traditional disabled," such as individuals who were blind, or deaf, or used wheelchairs, but also people who had stigmatizing medical conditions such as diabetes, or epilepsy, or morbid obesity. It covered not only people who were actually disabled, but those who had a record of a disability, such as cancer survivors, whom employers might be unwilling to hire for fear of increased medical insurance costs or future incapacity. The statute covered people who were not disabled at all, but were simply perceived as such, like people with asymptomatic HIV or a genetic predisposition towards a particular illness. It covered not only physical disabilities, but mental disabilities as well, arguably the most stigmatizing medical conditions in American society. FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 156 (1993) . 16 The term "discriminate," which was not defined at all in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, is defined in a highly detailed and multi-faceted way in Section102 of the A.D.A. With respect to reasonable accommodation, Section 102 provides that the term "discriminate" includes "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity." 42 U.S.C. §12112(b)(5)(A). The meaning of "undue hardship" is defined in the statutes implementing regulations at 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(p). 17 The "interactive process duty" is described at 29 C.F.R. §1630(o)(3). This section provides:
To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations. 6 situated individuals. As numerous legal scholars had observed, the equal treatment principle had not proven tremendously effective in addressing problems of equality and difference. 15 The ADA required not only that disabled individuals be treated no worse than non-disabled individuals with whom they were similarly situated, but also directed that in certain contexts they be treated differently, arguably better, to achieve an equal effect.
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In this regard, the statute and its implementing regulations required covered employers to do something that no federal employment rights statute had ever done before: it required them to engage with a disabled employee or applicant in a good faith interactive process to find ways to accommodate the employee's disability and enable him to work. 17 This "duty to bargain in good faith" represented a 7 dramatic shift in the ordinary power relationship between employers and employees on such issues as shift assignments, hours of work, physical plant, or the division of job duties among employees. At least in the non-union context, these had previously been aspects of the employer-employee relationship over which employers exercised exclusive control, subject of course to the basic non-discrimination principle that no applicant or employee could be treated less favorably for a reason specifically proscribed by law.
When enacted in the Summer of 1990, the ADA was the only employment-related federal civil rights statute that centrally featured a structural theory of equality. 32 See, e.g., Jonathan Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers and Civil Rights, supra note 31, at 1349-51 (discussing the concept of stigma in relation to disability rights law and policy); see generally 10 presence was in good faith viewed as presenting an elevated health or safety risk. In making any such assessment, the ADA seemed to require that an employer replace an "intuitive" or "popular" approach to risk assessment with more scientific methods and standards.
In short, the Americans with Disabilities Act appeared to be a "second generation" 30 civil rights statute, advancing both formal and structural models of equality by imposing a duty of accommodation as well as a duty of formal non-discrimination, regulating health and safety risk analysis in situations involving disabled employees or applicants, and extending these protections to an apparently wide class -a class ranging far beyond those traditionally viewed as "disabled" in legal and popular culture.
Supporters hailed it as a triumph of a new "civil rights" or "social" model of disability over an older and outmoded "impairment" or "public benefits" model. 31 The ADA promised to revive the concept of stigma as a powerful hermeneutic for the elaboration and judicial application of American civil rights law. 32 Supporters and detractors alike predicted that the structural approach to equality advanced by 11 the ADA might eventually diffuse into other areas of the law, eroding the entrenched understanding that equality always -and only -requires equal treatment under rules and practices assumed to be neutral.
The employment discrimination provisions of the ADA were gradually phased in between 1990
and 1994. Although passed in 1990, the Act did not become effective until 1992, 33 at which point Title I, which prohibits discrimination in employment, covered employers with 25 or more employees. 34 In 1994, coverage was extended to employers with 15 or more employees. 35 Within the disability activist community, expectations for the statute ran high. Within the employer community, so did concerns.
Across the country, large law firms began running training sessions for their employer clients and strategy development workshops for employment defense lawyers, who would soon busy themselves preventing and defending cases brought under the new law.
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As judicial opinions in Title I cases began to accumulate, it became clear that the Act was not being interpreted as its drafters and supporters within the disability rights movement had planned.
Indeed, by 1996 many in the disability community were speaking of an emerging judicial backlash addict-employee who spent much of the work day in a fetal position claimed protection of the ADA to avoid being fired. His "rights" to come in late, to have the lights dimmed, and to do little productive work are championed by a social worker, who, sporting a wrist brace for carpal tunnel syndrome, refers to himself and his addict-client as the "truly disabled." One by one, other employees at the business follow suit, until no one but the beleaguered manager is doing any work. Everyone else is claiming to be "disabled" and, under the sheltering wings of the ADA, immune from discipline or discharge.
Predictions that a backlash against the ADA might occur emerged as early as 1994. Perhaps the first such concern was voiced that year by Joseph Shapiro. In an article that troubled many ADA activists, Shapiro cautioned that because passage of the ADA was not preceded by a well-publicized social movement, the Act, along with the people who mobilized or enforced it, might be particularly In an attempt to encourage this sort of systematic thinking, the Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law brought together a remarkable group of disability activists and practitioners, and a distinguished group of scholars from the fields of law, sociology, psychology, political science, economics, history, and English literature whose work has centered on disability rights issues. Over the course of two days in March of 1999, this group, along with over 200 students, lawyers, and community members in attendance, collectively investigated the following questions implicated by public, judicial, and media responses to the ADA:
• What is "backlash?" Can it meaningfully be distinguished from other forms of retrenchment or resistance to social change initiatives?
• Is there in fact an ongoing backlash against the ADA and related disability rights initiatives?
• If so, how is that backlash manifesting in the media, in judicial decision making, and in academic or other social commentary?
• Assuming some discrete backlash phenomenon exists, to what factors might it reasonably be attributed? How can our efforts to understand this phenomenon be informed by insights from legal studies and from other disciplines, such as sociology, psychology, political science, economics, history, or disability studies? And finally;
• What are the implications of public, media, and judicial responses to the ADA for future strategies in disability advocacy and policy-making, or for strategy formulation in social justice movements more generally?
The thirteen papers and three responsive commentaries comprising this volume bring diverse, interdisciplinary perspectives to the investigation of these questions. Hahn argues that the crabbed judicial interpretations of the ADA described by Diller, Parmet, and Feldblum stem from three fundamental sources: 1) widespread judicial confusion over the relationship between impairment and disability; 2) the failure or refusal of judges to adopt a socio-political conception of disability; and 3) generalized resistance to the "minority group" approach to disability policy issues. He proceeds to trace the enduring influence of paternalism and covert hostility toward the disabled on judicial responses to disability discrimination claims, and proposes a principle of "Equal
Environmental Adaptations" as a tool for slicing through attitudinal and conceptual barriers to full implementation of the policy goals underlying the ADA.
Professor Davis continues this excavation of judicial attitudes towards people with disabilities in his intellectually playful and engaging essay, Bending Over Backwards: Disability, Narcissism, and the Law. Bringing Freud and Shakespeare to bear on the reading of ADA cases as narrative texts, Davis demonstrates that ADA plaintiffs are being portrayed in federal case law in much the same way as they have been depicted in English literature and Freudian theory --as narcissistic, self-concerned, and overly demanding. Davis' observations echo Harlan Hahn's claim that popular and legal discourse on disability remains heavily freighted with covert hostility and resentment directed toward the disabled.
Readers unfamiliar with the social model of disability will appreciate the concise and accessible overview of the subject provided by Richard Scotch's Models of Disability and the Response to the Americans with Disabilities Act. As Scotch explains, under an older "impairment" or "rehabilitation" model, disability is conceptually located within the disabled individual. Under this approach, an impairment is seen as causing "disability" if it prevents the disabled person from functioning effectively in the world-as-it-is. If the individual can be retrained or cured, he or she is no longer considered "disabled." If neither retraining nor cure is possible, social welfare benefits provide the disabled person with a subsistence income. Under this older model, which still underlies the federal social security disability system, a certification of disability operates as a kind of "ticket" into the system of rehabilitation and/or support, and signals to both the disabled individual and to members of the surrounding polity that the individual is neither expected nor entitled to function fully in the larger socioeconomic world.
The model of disability reflected in the ADA represents a fundamentally different theoretical framework. Under the social model, disability is seen as resulting not from impairment per se, but from an interaction between the impairment and the surrounding structural and attitudinal environment.
Under this approach, environments, not simply impairments, cause disability.
Two consequences flow from this conceptual understanding, one implicated in the definition of disability and the other in ascertaining society's proper response to it. First, under a social approach to disability, determining whether a particular condition is "disabling" requires an examination of the attitudinal and structural environment in which a person functions, not merely an examination of the person herself. Accordingly, an impairment may be "disabling" in one structural and attitudinal environment but not in another. Second, once "disability" is no longer located entirely within the impaired individual, but in the environment as well, the presence of an impairment can be seen as triggering societal obligation to change the environment, so that disabled individual can function despite her impairment. As the articles by Professors Hahn, Davis, and Scotch demonstrate, appreciating the differences between the "impairment" and "social" models of disability is central to understanding the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The next two articles, the first by Cary LaCheen and the second by Vicki Laden and Gregory Schwartz, examine the depiction of disability issues in the media and then trace those depictions into ADA jurisprudence and human resource management discourse. In Achy Breaky Pelvis, Lumber
Lung and Juggler's Despair: The Portrayal of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Television,
LaCheen identifies and explores a number of curious parallels between ADA media coverage and the treatment of disability issues in federal case law.
LaCheen's well-documented claim that television coverage of the ADA has been overwhelmingly negative, one-sided, and substantially misleading is profoundly important. (1980) . Gitlin defines media frames as "persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual." Id. at 7. Gitlin's construction draws on the earlier work of Erving Goffman, who in more general terms described frames as implicit theories about the nature of reality, used heuristically to comprehend, manage, and respond to it. See Erving Goffman, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE, 10-11 (1974) .
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attitudes toward legal rights and obligations are likely influenced more by people's beliefs about what legal and regulatory schemes require, how they are enforced, and the effects of enforcement on individuals and society than by actual legal doctrine, enforcement activities, or (to the extent they can be accurately measured) practical effects. Popular beliefs about law are shaped by many factors, including media coverage, through which a particular set of scripts, symbols, and condensing themes is transmitted to the reading and viewing public.
To the extent that a particular law or regulatory regime is politically controversial, that controversy will be enacted in the print and broadcast media, as positive and negative scripts, symbols, and condensing themes compete for audience attention. The particular condensing themes that prevail in this contest become the dominant cognitive and attitudinal frames through which people assign meaning to the law and construe efforts to mobilize or enforce it. These "media frames" 70 organize the relevant discourse, both for the journalists who create the coverage, and for the public, which reads, hears, or views it. Eventually, socio-cultural dissemination of particular media representations proceeds to the point that it becomes meaningful to refer to these representations not only as "media frames," but as broader "discursive frames," which influence popular attitudes towards the law, its enforcers, and its beneficiaries. 
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In Psychiatric Disabilities, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the New Workplace Violence Account, Vicki Laden and Greg Schwartz examine the impact of one particular discursive frame on judicial and public responses to the ADA. They identify a rhetorical construct which they refer to as the "new workplace violence account," and explore its use in attempts to delegitimate the ADA. Laden and Schwartz argue that the account's depiction of the volatile, psychotic employee, poised to explode in lethal violence, is used by media critics who claim that the ADA has deprived employers of the ability to protect employees from a potent workplace threat. They go on to describe a new workplace violence prevention industry, composed of defense-side employment lawyers, security experts, and consultants, who counsel employers on "how to identify and remove potentially violent workers in the hands-tied era of the ADA. 71 This rapidly expanding violence prevention industry, Laden and Schwartz contend, advances bold claims about the enormity and severity of the problem, reinforcing a key premise of ADA critics, that the Act unreasonably subordinates public safety interests to the "special rights" of the mentally ill. Through a close examination of judicial decisions and defense firm training materials on the one hand, and a review of relevant, current social science research on the other, Laden and Schwartz both expose the flawed empirical basis undergirding claims relating to prediction of dangerousness, and explore the implications of current scientific knowledge for compliance with the ADA and for administrative and judicial interpretation of its direct threat defense.
No interdisciplinary examination of an important socio-legal phenomenon would be complete without an examination of its constituent issues and problems from an economic perspective. The Disabilities. He argues that stagnation in disabled employment results not from unintended negative consequences of the ADA, but rather from a particular "taste for discrimination" which the ADA has thus far been unable to control.
In Backlash, the Political Economy, and Structural Exclusion, Marta Russell argues that public hostility toward the ADA is driven in large measure by the high levels of job instability and worker displacement characterizing American labor markets. These, she contends, breed insecurity, fear, and resentment toward employment protections extended to members of disadvantaged groups.
Russell suggests that hostility toward identity group-based employment protections will persist until employment at a living wage and access to health care are treated as fundamental rights attending membership in society, rather than as incidents of increasingly unstable employment status. The section concludes with the symposium commentary of economist Richard Burkhauser, who discusses selected claims made and issues raised in the previous three accounts. 72 Stephen Professor Percy's exploration raises, at least in this reader's mind, a number of intriguing questions about the problems associated with the use of indeterminate legal standards in complex regulatory regimes. Both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA incorporate standards which might reasonably be described as "complex," or "tempering." Figuring out how to comply with these standards, which include "reasonable accommodation," "undue hardship," even "disability" as the term is defined in the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, often requires a complex, situation-specific balancing of under-specified factors by unsophisticated legal actors. When one crafts laws utilizing complex tempering principles, how do they work? Do indeterminate standards function effectively in guiding statutory compliance, enforcement, or judicial interpretation? What strains do under-specified legal standards place on courts and administrative agencies, whose legitimacy often depends on perceptions that they are "applying" rather than "making" the law? Professor Percy's investigation suggests that, Is it a meaningful construct, or merely an epithet used by social change activists to describe the arguments and activities of their opponents? If it is a meaningful construct, how and why does it emerge? And finally, how do these questions relate to public, judicial, and media responses to the Americans with Disabilities Act?
In closing the Symposium, 74 I offer a tentative theoretical framework for addressing these questions, and apply that framework to various observations and insights offered by the Symposium's contributors. The central premise is simple: to understand the role of law in effecting social change, one must consider the relationship between formal legal rules and constructs on the one hand, and informal social norms and institutions on the other. At its root, backlash, whether directed against the ADA or against any other transformative legal regime, is about this relationship. It can be avoided, or addressed once it emerges, only through careful attention to the complex processes that mediate it.
